. So the questions urged upon us by our metaphysical drive were either pseudo-questions or unverifiable. Moreover, old metaphysics had not even managed to agree on a procedure to attempt an answer to such questions, unlike mathematics (p. 110).
3 But this is where KantÕs agreement with Hume ends. For the sceptic Hume threw the baby of metaphysics out with the dirty bath-water of pseudometaphysics. Indeed, seen from KantÕs point of view, Hume offered some bad metaphysics himself, for he was unable to account for metaphysical issues such as the principle that every event in nature has a cause, or for mathematical necessity (p.
111). As Kant points out in the Doctrine of Method, HumeÕs own scepticism had no proper justification. 4 Hume was a Ôgeographer of human reasonÕ who thought to quell the burning questions of metaphysics by locating their source beyond the limits of human reason, without being able to account for those very limits (B788).
In what follows, Moore develops KantÕs account of synthetic a priori knowledge and the correlated doctrine of transcendental idealism. This doctrine needs to embrace seemingly conflicting motives (if knowledge is knowledge of something independent of it, how can it be a priori? if it is a priori, how can it be synthetic, i.e. not purely conceptual? if it offers us metaphysical insight, how is it not a form of old metaphysics about experience-transcendent things?). Moore argues that Kant manages the remarkable and original feat of bringing these motives into a coherent whole, explaining transcendental idealism in terms of the metaphor of the (ÔnativeÕ) spectacles, which affect only how we see things, not which things we see (pp. 121f. Ôapplication to objects that can be given to us in intuitionÕ (B150f.) or it means, more generally, the feature a representation has when it is referring to an object, which requires that Ôthe object must be able to be given in some wayÕ (B194). But what does it mean in this context? At the end of the Dialectic Kant makes a distinction between an objectÕs being given either absolutely or in the Idea (B698). The objective reality of the categories relates to the former, that of Ideas to the latter. In the latter case we use Ideas to represent objects ÔindirectlyÕ, not to know their properties, but only to understand their greatest systematic unity in reason and experience (B698f.). In doing so, we derive the objects of experience from Ôthe imagined object of this Idea as its ground or causeÕ, which allows us to consider the world as if created by God etc. (cf.
also B706).
This is problematic in several respects. First, as Kant also argues, the objects of Ideas are mere analogues of real things (B702, 706), which means that the latter are required to make sense of the former. But this would involve a circularity, since Kant also argues, as just seen, that we derive real objects (objects of experience) from the objects of Ideas. Second, the object of the Idea is described as an imagined object (B698) and as a ÔSomething in generalÕ (B706). But the latter is the expression of my concept of an object, which is different from my concept of an imagined object.
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Moreover, while I can ÔpositÕ some real object in a context (e.g. assume that there is some unfamiliar object in my pocket), it is not clear how I posit the object of an Idea, which, given its utmost generality, is devoid of any context, is a real object (wirklichen Gegenstand) only as something in general (B705). My reasonÕs giving itself this supposed object (B709) is also not the same as my imagining it, for reason is surely distinct from imagination, since imagination is the representation of an object in intuition without its presence (B151).
One might reply that the problem concerning the objective reality of Ideas cannot be fully solved using the resources of KantÕs theoretical philosophy, but requires an engagement with his practical philosophy. Indeed, it is in this context that Kant returns to the problem, speaking about the objective, but practical reality of Ideas (e.g. Fortschritte, 20: 300), which he also describes as Ômoral-practical realityÕ (Zum ewigen Frieden, 8: 416) . Our Ideas obtain this reality through the categorical imperative, which simply amounts to our acting as if their objects, God and immortality, were given, i.e. as if we had knowledge of God and our immortality (ibid.).
sensory intuition for Kant. We would have to be able to make sense of knowledge of an object which no experience can give (B709), of knowledge of something about which the question whether it is a substance, whether it has necessity, whether it has the greatest reality, etc., has no significance (B724). In other words, this would require us to make sense of the possibility of knowledge about an object about which the question which properties it has lacks significance, which looks like a straightforward contradiction. As Ôa mere Idea, it must find its seat and its resolution in the nature of reasonÕ. At the same time reason maintains its drive for the infinite, and cannot be repressed to throw Ôa glance on the wonders of nature and the majesty of the worldÕs architecture Ð by which it elevates itself from magnitude to magnitude up the highest of all, rising from the conditioned to the condition, up to the supreme and unconditioned AuthorÕ (B652; section on the physico-theological proof). ReasonÕs desire for the absolute appears to be struggling here against its own tendency to dissolve its own noble aim.
In conclusion, it appears that reason, on KantÕs account, remains in disunity with itself. The question is whether this is so due to a Ômere misunderstandingÕ, this time example (see note 4 above). Pascal is another: ÔThis is our true state; this is what renders us incapable both of certain knowledge and of absolute ignorance. We sail on a vast expanse, ever uncertain, ever drifting, hurried from one to the other goal. If we think to attach ourselves firmly to any point, it totters and fails us; if we follow, it eludes our grasp, and flies us, vanishing for ever. Nothing stays for us. This is our natural condition, yet always the most contrary to our inclination; we burn with desire to find a steadfast place and an ultimate fixed basis whereon we may build a tower to reach the infinite. But our whole foundation breaks up, and earth opens to the abyssesÕ (Pascal 1901: 23) . For ample evidence of how widespread the motive of the Ôweakness of reasonÕ was during the Enlightenment, see Tonelli 1971. 
